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I. INTRODUCTION
"Bankruptcy is a gloomy and depressing subject."' A Chinese say-
ing goes: "May you live in interesting times."'2 The end of the twentieth
century which brought the collapse of Communism undoubtedly presents
such "interesting times." Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were
satellites states of the former Soviet Union. When traveling in any of the
former East Bloc Countries as late as early 1988, one would not have
thought it possible that Communism was at the verge of its collapse.
When Hungary took down the barbed wires between her border with
Austria, many East Germans took advantage of that fact by traveling to
Austria through Hungary and then, by applying within the West German
1. CHARtLs WARRN, BANKRuprcY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 3 (1972).
2. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 51 (1995).
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embassy, automatically becoming a citizen of West Germany.3 The events
sped up and on November 9, 1989, tens of thousands of Germans
climbed across the Berlin Wall.
Similarly, people in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were taking to the
streets and demanding their governments' resignation. Poland had been in
a different situation since the early 1980s when the Solidarity Labor
Union received many concessions from the Polish government. Every-
body was scared to see how the Soviet Union, usually referred to as Rus-
sia, would react to those demands. Nevertheless, people saw hope be-
cause Mikhael Gorbachev (and possibly a lot of the old Soviet
establishment) recognized that one cannot permanently oppress the peo-
ple of other nations. As a result of this recognition, political and eco-
nomic changes lay ahead for those nations.
The three countries in Eastern Europe that have made the most pro-
gress toward transition to market economies are: the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland.4 This paper will first take a look at how privatiza-
tion of formerly state-owned property was facilitated. Next, there will be
a brief look at how bankruptcy works in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland. The paper then will look at Section 304 of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code and how likely it would be for a bankruptcy estate trustee
from any of the three nations to succeed under Section 304, which gov-
erns cases ancillary to foreign bankruptcy proceedings.
As a preliminary matter, there is no case law to this point, which is
understandable given the fact that an estate in bankruptcy in one of the
three nations is unlikely to include debtor's property within the United
States. However, with those countries having the potential of becoming
well- developed and industrialized or service-oriented economies, it is
very likely that such a situation will arise in the future.
11. THE CoNvERsIoN FROM STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES TO PRIVATELY-
OWNED ENTERPRISES AS WELL AS THE CREATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
Under Communism, the government owned most assets and planned
the actions of most economic actors, such as banks, enterprise managers,
and labor.5 Through centralized control, the state ensured an artificially
3. Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, PrAambel (The German Constitu-
tion or the Basic Law, preamble). The German constitution never recognized an indepen-
dent East German state and therefore, there was only one German citizenship. Id. Al-
though one had to go through an official paper process, it was a formality.
4. Pamela Bickford Sak & Henry N. Schiffman, Bankruptcy Law Reform in Eastern
Europe, 28 INT'L LAw 927, 928 (Winter 1994).
5. Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, Institutional Reform in Eastern Europe:
Evolution or Design?, 1992 BYU L. REv. 1, 2 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey & Enrico
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stable economy through its control of the allocation of investment, credit,
and wages.6 This artificially stable economy ignored profits;7 moreover, it
distorted the statistics of the financial health of the economy.8 This in-
stilled the perception of a stable socio-economic system9 not only in
banks and state-owned enterprises,' 0 but also in the general public." Two
results of this planned economy were the absence of bankruptcies and
full employment.12 Therefore, economic actors, as we understand them in
a market economy, were not financially disciplined, but were indifferent
about profits or economic success.' 3 Under Communism, people were in-
sulated from competition and therefore, had no profit motive.'
4
Colombatto, Public Choice Theory and the Transition Market Economy in Eastern Eu-
rope: Currency Convertibility and Exchange Rates, 28 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 387, 388
(1995).
6. Carolyn Brzezinski, Competition and Antitrust Law in Central Europe: Poland,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1129, 1130 (1994).
7. Fred Luthans et al., Doing Business in Central and Eastern Europe: Political,
Economic, and Cultural Diversity, Bus. HORIZONS, Vol. 38, No. 5, Sept. 1995, at 12
[hereinafter Luthans, Doing Business]; Alisa Yamnarm, Note, The Crisis of Unemploy-
ment and the Future of Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary as a Model, 3
CARDOZO J. INT'L. & CoIp. L. 181, 189-90 (1995).
8. See, e.g., Steve Campbell, Comment, Brother, Can You Spare a Ruble? The De-
velopment of Bankruptcy Legislation in the New Russia, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 354-55
(1994) (noting the former Soviet Russian practice of supporting inefficient firms).
9. Ronald Daniels & Robert Howse, Reforming the Reform Process: A Critique of
Proposals for Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe, 25 N.YU. J. INT'L L & POL.
27, 67 (1992); see Luthans, Doing Business, supra note 5, at 12; see also Frydman &
Rapaczynski, Institutional Reform, supra, note 5, at 15 (commenting on the "long tradi-
tion of government paternalism").
10. Paul Marer, Transformation of a Centrally-Directed Economy: Ownership and
Privatization in Hungary During 1990, in Privatization and Entrepreneurship in Post-
Socialist Countries 173, 178 (Bruno Dallage et al. eds., 1992).
11. See, e.g., Michele Balfour & Cameron Crise, A Privatization Test: The Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Poland, 17 FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 84, 85 (1993) ("[Pjrivatization
will impose economic hardship on the public, which will demand the relief it is accus-
tomed to receiving from political leadership.").
12. David C. Bangert, Hungary: Exploring New European Management Challenges,
INT'L STUD. OF MGMT. & Org., Vol. 24, No. 1-2, Mar. 22, 1994, at 209, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ARCNEWS file.
13. See Macey & Colombatto, supra note 5, at 389.
14. See, e.g., Marton Tardos, Property Relations in the Period of Transition, in
PRIVATIZATION AND EmREPRENEu tSHP IN PosT-SocmAuST COuUNS 59 (Bruno Dallage,
et al. eds., 1992). See also Brzezinski, supra note 6, at 1129-30, 1129 n.3 (noting how
Communist "non-competitive" economic systems created a need for competition law);
Stephen S. Cohen & Andrew Schwartz, The Tunnel at the End of the Light: Privatization
in Eastern Europe, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 7, 12-17 (1994); George Bogdan, The Economic
and Political Logic of Mass Privatization in Czechoslovakia and Poland, 4 CARDOzo J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 43, 43-45 (1996) (noting that, as a result of an extensive history of
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In contrast, capitalism attempts to allocate scarce resources in the
best way possible. As a consequence, multinational companies become
insolvent. It is not unusual for such occasions that bankruptcy proceed-
ings are commenced in every country which does business or has
assets.
15
Within the twentieth century, the countries under Communist re-
gimes saw their most complete legal reforms in that the revolutionaries
replaced the law, politics, and economics of the old regime with a cen-
trally-planned economy.16 With the demise of Communism, those coun-
tries faced the problem of how to revert back to pre-Communist condi-
tions and how to achieve a fast and smooth transition to a market
economy. For reasons discussed above, there had been no need for basic
market mechanisms, such as bankruptcy laws' 7 or competition laws. 8
With the end of Communism, the Central and Eastern European (CEE)
nations hurried to start their socio-economic transition toward market
economies.' 9 Although the three countries had made the political transi-
tion, a more serious issue was how to establish private property, which is
one of the building blocks of a free market economy. The three countries
undertook different approaches in achieving the privatization of their
economies.
Before discussing each country's approach, it is important to note
that in CEE nations the rationale for privatization varied, but was domi-
nated by the need for economic reform. As such, it is essential to recog-
nize that privatization in those countries was not just a simple transfer of
ownership from the state to private individuals, but rather a process by
which the very institution of property, as it is understood by lawyers and
economists of a western ideology, was reintroduced into Eastern Euro-
pean societies. 20 Privatization in former centrally-planned economies nec-
centralized planning, post-Communist Eastern European countries "have to recreate pri-
vate property and capital markets virtually from scratch"). For a definition of profit-
maximization, see A. Mrrcimu POLIUMSY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10
(2d ed. 1989).
15. Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Cri-
tique of the Inconsistent Approaches of the United States Courts, 66 AM. BANKR. L. J.
135 (Spring, 1992).
16. Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of Market Modernization of Law, 16 INT'L REV.
L. & EcoN. 141, 146 (1996).
17. See Brzezinski, supra note 6, at 1130; Campbell, supra note 8, at 346.
18. See Brzezinski, supra note 6, at 1130.
19. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 11, at 85; see, e.g., Sak & Schiffman, supra
note 4, at 927 (noting that CEE nations "formerly had centrally planned economies and
decided in the past few years to adopt new economic systems").
20. Jeremy Leaman, Regulatory Reform and Privatization in Germany in PRIVATIZA-
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essarily has some social costs, which are usually associated with loss of
employment, a condition unknown under Communism. Some examples
will illustrate this point. In Poland, the official rate of unemployment
rose from zero percent in 1989 to 11.4% at the end of 1991.21 In Czech-
oslovakia, the rate of unemployment went from zero percent to 5.5% at
the end of 1992.22 Lastly, in Hungary unemployment went from zero per-
cent to 8% by the end of 1991.23 Another social cost is the loss of tradi-
tional business. One such example is the closing of the shipyard in
Gdansk, Poland, where in 1980 the "Solidarity Labor Union" under the
leadership of Lech Walesa achieved tremendous success in gaining con-
cessions from the Polish government.24
Privatization continued, however, and the three CEE nations under
discussion approached it in different ways.25 There appeared to be two
paradigmatic approaches to effectuate privatization, these being the
"fast" track privatization and the "moderate" track privatization. 6
A. The Czech Republic and the Fast Privatization Track
The Czech Republic attempted to convert its state-owned enterprises
as fast as possible. To effectuate such a change, the government under-
took a series of actions, these being: reduction of state spending/subsi-
dies, lifting of price controls, and making the Czech currency, the Ko-
TION AND REGULATORY CHANGE IN EUROPE 14, 19-33 (Michael Moran & Tony Prosser,
eds., 1994); see also J.A. Kay & D.J. Thompson, Privatisation: A Policy in Search of a
Rationale, 96 ECON. J. 18-32 (1986); see generally COSMO GRAHAM & TONY PROSSER,
PIVATimiNG PUBLIC ENTERPRISES (1991).
21. Andrew Berg & Olivier Jean Blanchard, Stabilization and Transition: Poland,
1990-91, in 1 THE TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE: COUNTRY STUDIES 54 (Olivier Jean
Blanchard et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter COUNTRY STUDIES].
22. Karel Dyba & Jan Svejnar, Stabilization and Transition in Czechoslovakia, in
CoUNTRY STUDIES, supra note 21, at 93, 96.
23. Kemal Dervis & Timothy Condon, Hungary-Partial Successes and Remaining
Challenges: The Emergence of a "Gradualist" Success Story?, in COUNTRY STUDIES,
supra note 21, at 123, 134-35.
24. Daniel Michaels, Emerging Europe: Gdansk Yard Falls Victim to Capitalism,
WALL ST. J. EUR., Mar. 7, 1997, at 4.
25. See infra Part II.A-C, discussing the approaches to privatization undertaken by
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
26. Different terms are used to describe the same approaches. See Ronald A. Cass,
The Optimal Pace of Privatization, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 413, 433-34 (1995) (using the
terms 'rapid' or 'quick' privatization); Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 9-11 (juxta-
posing 'gradualists and radical capitalists'). Depending on what method of privatization
was utilized by the various countries, the bankruptcy codes created differed accordingly.
See infra Part M.
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tuna, convertible." Next, the government implemented a voucher
system. 28 Under the voucher system, people were permitted to buy
vouchers or coupons with a value equivalent to one week's wages and
use them to bid during the auctioning of state-owned enterprises. 29 The
auctioning off of government or state-owned enterprises took place in
two steps. In 1990, approximately 100,000 to 120,000 restaurants, shops,
and small businesses were privatized in what was called the "small
privatization" program. 30 This was followed by the "large privatization"
program in April of 1991, whereby the state sold mid-size and larger
state-owned enterprises. 31 This system worked rather fast and within a
short time the majority of state-owned operations had been converted
into privately-owned enterprises. 32 One can only speculate as to the ratio-
nale underlying the Czech Republic's fast track approach. One reason
could have been the facilitation of foreign investment.
33
B. Hungary and the Slow Track Approach to Privatization
Hungary took a somewhat slower approach and attempted to convert
state-owned enterprises at a more moderate pace. Hungary did not be-
lieve in the speedy approach set forth by Czechoslovakia "Czech Repub-
lic" because such a quick approach would not guarantee enterprises
achieving market efficiency.34 More important, the Hungarian government
believed that a speedy conversion would not generate the new capital re-
27. The New Bohemians, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 1994, 23 [hereinafter The Bohemians],
available in LEXIS, News Library, MAGS File.
28. Id. at 23-24 (recognizing Czech privatization as a 'big bang' and as a 'fast and
efficient privatisation programme'); East European Privatisation, Making It Work, ECONO-
Ms'r, Mar. 13, 1993, at 90-93; William C. Philbrick, The Task of Regulating Investment
Funds in the Formerly Centrally Planned Economies, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 539, 554
(1994).
29. See The Bohemians, supra note 27, at 24.
30. ROMAN FRYDMAN et al., THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 63,
77-78 (1993) (describing Act 427 of 1990, entitled, "About the Transfer of State Property
and Some Things to Other Legal or Physical Persons").
31. Id. at 79-80.
32. Jan Winiecki, Privatization in East-Central Europe: Avoiding Major Mistakes, in
Tan EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE (Christopher Clague and
Gordon C. Rausser, eds.) 271, 276.
33. It is generally understood that recourse can be had much easier against a pri-
vately-owned enterprise in the court of a country than can be had against a government-
operated/owned enterprise, if only because of the sovereign immunity doctrine which is
common to most modem legal systems. See Teresa D. Baer, Note, Injunctions Against the
Prosecution of Litigation Abroad: Towards a Transnational Approach, 37 STAN. L. REv.
155 (Nov. 1984).
34. Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 33.
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quired to support its newly-created private enterprises. 35
In contrast, the gradual approach envisioned a system where the
government would rebuild a regional network of industrial markets, yet
at the same time preserve a functioning, reliable state administration.36
Although there were some voices for faster privatization, the ruling So-
cialist Party prevailed with the gradual approach.37 Accordingly, in 1989,
the Hungarian Parliament passed the Act on Transformation,38 pursuant to
which, in September of 1990, Hungary began the gradual initial priva-
tization of twenty large companies through competitive tenders, public
offerings, or employee share ownership plans. 39 Hungary chose not to ex-
pose herself to a speedy, mass privatization. 4° It actually left the pace of
privatization to the spontaneity of the market. The state did not adopt a
strict set of privatization rules but took a decentralized approach, which
was seen as a "case-by-case, market driven approach to transactions." 4'
C. Poland and the Non-Paradigmatic Approach to Privatization
Under the Polish socialist regime, private ownership was the rule
rather than the exception. 42 As a result, the transformation to private
ownership of land was easier than in the Czech Republic and Hungary.43
In the past, ownership was divided into various classes with social own-
ership, which included ownership by the state, cooperatives, and social
organizations, given the highest status."4 The Polish Constitution of 1989
35. Id. at 31-32; see also Peter Rutland, Privatization in East Europe: Another Case
of Words that Succeed and Policies That Fail?, 5 TRANSNAT'L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1,
3 (1995).
36. Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 32-33.
37. See Marer, supra note 10, at 182. (The Association of Free Democrats believed
that "it was counterproductive to attach too many conditions and constraints" to prices
and sale or transfer terms).
38. See id. at 180.
39. See id. at 182-83.
40. See Philbrick, supra note 28, at 550-51; Rachel Wood & Eva Talmgcsi,
Privatisation in Hungary, 23 INT'L Bus. LAW 243, 244 (1995).
41. See Wood & Talmacsi, supra note 40, at 244; see also FRYDMAN, supra note 30,
at 132-33.
42. CHERYL W. GRAY ET AL., THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATE SEcroR DEvEL-
OPMENT IN A TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY: THE CASE OF POLAND 2-9 (Country Economics
Dept., The World Bank, Policy Research Papers No. WPS 800, Nov. 1991).
43. See id.
44. See id. at 3. Under Polish socialist law, "social ownership" was the highest cat-
egory of ownership and was protected by the Constitution and the Civil and Criminal
Codes. Examples of such property included means of production, i.e., land, mineral re-
sources and public utilities. "Personal property," in contrast,, included property used for
personal consumption, i.e., one's own dwelling house (but not a rental house, which was
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and the Civil Code of 1990 eliminated these classes and different prop-
erty strata.45
In order to privatize "social ownership" property, one first had to
determine ownership. Vast amounts of property was determined to be
state-owned, which included municipalities and other local governments. 46
The newly-designated state property could now be privatized. 47 The
privatization process has been somewhat slow and foreign investment has
not realized as much as the country had hoped for,4 partly because of
the heavy foreign debt and the hostile attitude of the Polish people them-
selves. 49 Another problem with privatization is that in 1990 the An-
timonopoly Office ("AMO") was created in accordance with the Act on
Counteracting Monopolistic Practices. ° The AMO can veto any privatiza-
tion process and has done so frequently.5' Finally, in Poland, the liquida-
tion process is the preferred means of privatization. 52 The liquidation pro-
cess will be discussed in the next section.
H. BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORM IN THE THREE CEE NATIONS
Of all the countries in Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland have made the most progress towards transition to market
economies. 53 One factor determining whether a market economy exists is
the presence of a bankruptcy code, which under Communism and a cen-
trally-planned economy was not needed.54 Overnight, it became evident
that all three countries faced a need for a forced structuring of the mar-
considered a means of production). Personal property was afforded less constitutional pro-
tection and was subject to a heavy taxation and limitation on use and transferability. Id.
(footnote omitted).
45. See id. at 3-4.
46. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 11, at 116-17.
47. See GRAY ET A.., supra note 42, at 4.
48. Blaine Harden, Town Sews, Reaps Against the Odds, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
1992, at Al, A22. See also Balfour & Crise, supra note 11, at 122-23 (discussing that
Poland, with a population larger than the population of Hungary, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia combined, has attracted less foreign investment than each of the other three na-
tions on its own).
49. See Harden, supra note 48, at A22 (discussing the Polish people's lack of recep-
tiveness toward foreign capital).
50. Act of Feb. 24, 1990 on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices art. 17 (Pol.),
NITS NO. PB92-961022, 1992 WL 563320.
51. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 11, at 118.
52. See id. at 120. In 1992, 62% of the finns undergoing privatization applied for
liquidation as the route to privatization. Id.
53. See Sak & Schiffman, supra note 4, at 928.
54. See supra Part II.
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ket. It was necessary to establish a cooperative market that linked its par-
ticipants, i.e, government, labor, suppliers, manufacturers, and consum-
ers.55 Under Communism, these links did not exist; in fact, they were not
needed because the state made impossible the very concept of market
failure.56 Further, the banking industry needed an overhaul and could no
longer be just a means of the authority to reallocate resources from
healthy enterprises to debtor enterprises which otherwise would have be-
come insolvent.57 Last, the former CEE nations needed to develop a sys-
tem that provided free market concepts such as property and equity own-
ership,58 profit-motive,59 and, more importantly, market failure, thus
recognizing bankruptcy as the final market corrective. °
All three nations are looking toward the West, in particular, Ger-
many, in an attempt to emulate an important element of the commercial
law of the economically very successful West Germany.61 Communism
created a lot of problems which needed rectification, and Western advi-
sors deem bankruptcy laws an essential element in the restructuring of
the former CEE economies. 62
There are four reasons why Western advisors recommended bank-
ruptcy law in the post-Communist context. First, bankruptcy laws provide
a mechanism which deals with failed enterprises, i.e., the information
provided allows creditors to make more efficient investment decisions.63
55. See Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 21.
56. See Eastern Metamorphosis Is Radical but Uneven, IvEsToRs CHRON., THE FIN.
TIMEs LImrrED, Oct. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNEWS file (stat-
ing that banks are often unwilling to file bankruptcy suits against borrowers because they
do not want to appear responsible for mass company closures).
57. See generally FRYDMAN. supra note 30.
58. See Prepared Statement of the Honorable Ralph R. Johnson Before the Subcom-
mittee on Small Business, Federal News Service, May 12, 1994, at 92, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ARCNEWS file.
59. See Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 13.
60. Scott Horton, The Death of Communism and Bankruptcy Reorganization, 13 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 12, 12 (1994).
61. See Einflhrungsgesetz zur Insolvenzordnung, BGBI.I (Oct. 5, 1994), applicable
in the former West Germany; see also Gesamtvollstreckungsordnung, BGB1. I (June
1991), applicable in the former East Germany. The German legislature approved a new
bankruptcy law in April and July of 1994. It will be in effect beginning January 1, 1999.
See Germany to Revise Insolvency Law, Bus. EuR., Nov. 29, 1991, at 5 (announcing the
introduction of a bill providing for total revision of Germany's bankruptcy laws).
62. Chris Aujard, The Legal Dimension, CENT. EUR., 1995, at 13, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file; see also Peggy Simpson, No Easy Fix for Ineffec-
tive Bankruptcy Laws, WARSAW Bus. J., May 5, 1995, at 7.
63. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 345; Evan D. Flaschen & Timothy B. Desieno,
The Development of Insolvency Law as Part of the Transition from a Centrally-Planned
to a Market Economy, 26 INT'L LAW. 667, 669-70 (1992).
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Second, pressure is put on inefficient and insolvent firms, thus promoting
the voluntary reallocation of assets.6" Third, a debtor can re-enter the
market and start anew after the work-out is arranged without having his
post-bankruptcy earnings made subject to prior creditors' claims.6 Lastly,
bankruptcy can facilitate a transition of ownership from state ownership
to private ownership via the liquidation process.66 Although Western ad-
visors promoted the introduction of a bankruptcy code for the former
CEE nations, they did not suggest specific bankruptcy models for each
nation.67 Depending on the mode of privatization used in different na-
tions, countries created varying bankruptcy codes.68 The discussion below
will look at each of the three countries with regard to the following is-
sues: 1) the definition of insolvency and administration of the bankruptcy
proceeding; 2) the rights and obligations of both debtors and creditors; 3)
the distribution of assets-priorities and post-bankruptcy creditors; 4)
fraudulent conveyances and avoidance powers; and 5) discharge - treat-
ment of the debtors pre-bankruptcy debts.
A. The Czech Republic
1. Definition of Insolvency and Administration
of the Bankruptcy Proceeding
In the Czech Republic, bankruptcy is regulated by the Bankruptcy
Act.69 Bankruptcy is triggered when the debtor is unable to meet obliga-
64. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 346. Advisors recommend not to leave any dis-
cretion with either the creditors or the debtors, but rather to proceed in a strict fashion to
effectuate a speedy reallocation of the resources, thereby ignoring any concern of the lo-
cal managers for unemployment. See also FRitmAN. supra note 30, at 129; Flaschen &
Desieno, supra note 63, at 679-80.
65. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 346; Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits
of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487, 497 (1996); Carolyn Hochstadter Dicker, Minimiz-
ing Risk: Securing a Loan with an Anticipated Tax Refund, 13 BANKR. STRATEGIST 3, 4
(1996); see generally Mark A Frankel, Federal Taxation of Corporate Reorganizations,
66 Am. BAwx L J. 55 (1992).
66. See Stilpon Nestor & Scott Thomas, Privatization Through Liquidation: Econo-
mies in Transition: Industry Overview, OECD OBSERVER, No. 192, Feb. 1995, at 36; Hor-
ton, supra note 60, at 12; Flaschen & Desieno, supra note 63, at 670-72.
67. See Flaschen & Desieno, supra note 63, at 668-69; David Fondler, Seminar Fo-
cuses on Flaws in the Country's Bankruptcy Laws, PRAGUE POST, June 7, 1995; Sak &
Schiffman, supra note 4, at 927-29; Horton, supra note 60, at 12; Balfour & Crise, supra
note 11, at 90; Simpson, supra note 62, at 7.
68. See supra Part ll.A-C, discussing the fast, moderate and non-paradigmatic ap-
proaches to privatization in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, respectively.
69. The Bankruptcy and Composition Act (No. 328/1991 Coll.) Of 11 July 1991
thereinafter CRBA], amended by Act No. 122/1993 Coll. Of 25 March 1993.
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tions to a number of creditors for an extended period of time.70 A debtor
is deemed to be unable to pay creditors when he has ceased to make
payments. 7' How long is an extended period of time? Practice shows that
when several creditors lose their patience and file a suit, an extended pe-
riod of time has passed.72 The CRBA theoretically also provides for a
balance-sheet insolvency.73 Since the inception of the CRBA, the number
of creditor-initiated bankruptcies has increased enormously. 74
Jurisdiction of the bankruptcy proceeding lies with the regional or
municipal court where the debtor has its seat or residence. 7 The court
has the discretion to appoint and supervise the bankruptcy trustee.76 The
court is afforded a high degree of discretionary power with regard to
both the appointment of the trustee and the supervision of the bankruptcy
proceeding; in fact, the CRBA denies any right of appeal against the
court's supervision of the proceeding. 77 Claims made by a creditor
against the debtor are disposed of within the bankruptcy proceeding. 78
The resolution of all bankruptcy claims is sometimes very time-
consuming.79
2. The Rights and Obligations of Debtors and Creditors
Once a debtor has filed a petition for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy
code provides for an automatic stay whereby creditors cannot proceed
70. See id. § 1(2).
71. Id. § 4(2).
72. See Sak & Schiffman, supra note 4, at 933 n.11.
73. See CRBA, supra note 69, § 1(3). This appears to be less important because as-
sets are often overvalued and therefore, the inability of the debtor to pay will be the
dominant test.
74. As many as 1,592 bankruptcy petitions were filed by February 1, 1994. James
B. Varanese & Antje Westphal, Debt-for-Equity: The Czech Republic's Swapping for Sur-
vival Game, 5 Suav. E. EUR. L. 1, 9 (Apr. 1994). In fact, it appears as if the laws em-
body a policy that promotes liquidation rather than reorganization. See Sak & Schiffman,
supra note 4, at 934. Interestingly, no provision is made in the CRBA for a debtor to ini-
tiate a liquidation bankruptcy proceeding, but only to have a compulsory settlement (reor-
ganization) forced on the creditor. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text
75. See CRBA, supra note 69, § 3(1).
76. Id. §§ 11(a), 12(1).
77. Id. §§ 12(a)(1)-(2).
78. Id. §§ 23, 24. Should one creditor oppose the claim of another creditor, the
bankruptcy code requires that such creditors file a separate lawsuit outside the bankruptcy
proceeding at which the claim is at issue. Id. § 23(2). Should there be a claim asserted by
the trustee against a creditor, then the trustee may choose to proceed within the bank-
ruptcy proceeding or may bring a separate action. Id. § 24(1).
79. See supra note 78.
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against the debtor.80 Generally, a creditor has to assert a claim against the
debtor and the bankruptcy code provides both for settlement and for
compulsory settlement of such claims,"' thus creating a potential for re-
structuring before a declaration of bankruptcy by the court.82 A debtor
who would qualify for bankruptcy proceedings can propose such a settle-
ment proceeding.8 3 A settlement proceeding is seen as an attempt to
restructure and, therefore, the debtor proposing such a proceeding must
include a reorganization plan.84 The plan must provide for a minimum of
forty-five percent satisfaction of unsecured creditors' claims 5 and the
creditors whose rights are impaired will vote on whether to accept the
settlement.8 Even if the creditors as a whole approve of the plan, the fi-
nal decision is with the court.87
A debtor may petition the court to have a compulsory settlement
forced on the creditors.88 The court will review the debtor's proposal 9
and, given the compliance with certain criteria, 9°will grant the compul-
sory settlement. The court must make an "integrity" judgment over the
debtor's managerial and economic skills and, should it find that the
debtor acted dishonestly or unreasonably, the court is required to reject
the settlement.91 Should the settlement plan be rejected, a liquidation pro-
80. See CRBA, supra note 69, § 14(l)(e).
81. Id. §§ 34-43, 46-66.
82. See Varanese & Westphal, supra note 74, at 9 (discussing that before declaring
bankruptcy, the court may allow a restructuring period of three to six months, or longer,
during which a newly founded enterprise is protected from creditors' claims).
83. See CRBA, supra note 69, § 46(1).
84. Id. § 46(3). During such a "reorganization," however, the code imposes rather
stringent conditions, i.e., the debtor's rights to transfer property, incur new debt, or other-
wise impair the rights of the creditors are suspended, meaning, the debtor cannot conduct
business as usual. Id. § 49(1).
85. Id. § 50(d).
86. Id. § 58. Interestingly, the code does not provide a percentage of how many
creditors need to accept the settlement plan.
87. Id. § 61(2)(a), (c). Some of the criteria for the court's decision in approving or
denying a settlement plan include: the debtor is financially in a much better situation and
could make higher payments than the plan calls for, or the settlement is very disadvanta-
geous to the dissenting creditors. Id.
88. Id. § 34.
89. Id. §§ 20-25.
90. Creditors having seventy-five percent of the claims must approve of the settle-
ment, id. § 38(1); a secured creditor's right cannot be involuntarily impaired, id. § 36(1);
the costs of administration or claims of employees must be paid in full, id. § 36(b); at
least one-third of non-priority claims must be scheduled to be paid within one year, id.
§ 40(l)(e).
91. Id. § 40(1)(f). What is unreasonable is not defined in the code. Presumably, it
falls within the discretionary power of the court to determine the scope of
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ceeding is the next step.
A bankruptcy proceeding can also be initiated by a creditor. In that
situation, the amended bankruptcy code provides for a period of three to
six months during which the court will not formally initiate bankruptcy
proceedings. 92 During the protective period, the debtor must make good
faith efforts to negotiate with the creditors over the possibility of a settle-
ment.93 During the three to six month period, the debtor is protected from
most claims asserted by creditors.94 The code is very specific with regard
to waiver of rights, and failure to comply with statutory deadlines results
in waiver of claims.95
3. Distribution of Assets-Priorities and Post-Bankruptcy Creditors
The highest priority is afforded to secured claims.96 A settlement (re-
structuring or reorganization) is doomed to fail if the reorganized busi-
ness will not be able to obtain new financing. Therefore, the CRBA ac-
cords claims to first-class status for credits initiated after the bankruptcy
proceedingY7
With regard to unsecured claims, the CRBA arranges the claims into
first, second, and third-class claims. Within the first-class claims, admin-
istrative expenses are accorded the highest priority, 98 followed by em-
ployees' claims for three years prior to the bankruptcy.99 Governmental
unreasonableness.
92. Id. § 5c.
93. Id. §§ 5d, e, f. Somewhat troublesome is the question of what constitutes good
faith effort. Should the debtor be allowed to continue in conducting his business and
thereby, possibly, impair any creditors' interests? The law should make a provision that
any activity undertaken in the ordinary course of business does not constitute an impair-
ment of any creditors' interests. However, article 5d(d) of the amended code sets forth
that no action of the debtor should infringe on the interests of the creditor. This does not
square well with an attempt in reorganization of a business.
94. The exceptions are employee claims and claims with regard to tax, and social
and health insurance. Id. § 5d(b).
95. Id. § 5a(2) (granting a debtor fifteen days to apply for such a three to six month
protection period and creditors have fifteen days after the commencement of proceedings
to file claims).
96. See Sak & Schiffman, supra note 4, at 948. This is the same situation in most
countries, cf United States, Germany, and most of the EU countries. The flow of credit is
one of the building stones of the economy and for creditors to lend money, they want to
have the assurance that they have the first right of access to the collateral.
97. See CRBA, supra note 69, §§ 31(2), 32(1), 52(2).
98. Id. § 67.
99. Id. Section 67a, as amended, provides, however, that claims made by manage-
ment personnel shall be considered a first-class claim only up to the amount of Czech
Koruna 10,000 ($300) per month. Any excess will be bifurcated into a non-priority claim.
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claims for taxes, fees, duties, and social security withholdings within
three years prior to and while in bankruptcy constitute the second-class
of priorities. 1'0 All other non-priority claims are third-class claims.'0' Fi-
nally, interest on both pre-bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy claims as well
as extra-contractual penalties are not recognized as a valid claim alto-
gether. 0 2 Should two creditors dispute the classification of a claim, 103 the
court as supervisor of the proceeding gives deference to the original clas-
sification of the claim by either the trustee or statute.104 Therefore, such
disputes are without much chance of changing the priority status of a
claim.
4. Fraudulent Conveyances and Avoidance Powers
What happens when a debtor shortly before petitioning for bank-
ruptcy conveys property or makes payments to selected people or classes
of creditors? Those assets will not be available for the trustee to dis-
tribute or for other creditors to assert claims against. It can be said that
such a transfer is not fair to either of the last two groups. It is the debtor
who knows best about his intention to file for bankruptcy without giving
the other creditors a fair chance. As a matter of equitable treatment of all
creditors, no debtor should be given the discretionary power to determine
which creditor gets paid in full and which creditor ends up empty-
handed. Therefore, any such transfer should be declared void. 1' 5
The CRBA provides that under a regular bankruptcy proceeding,
any security interest granted to a creditor within two months before the
formal petitioning of the debtor for a bankruptcy proceeding is void. °6 In
the case of a creditor-initiated bankruptcy proceeding whereby the debtor
100. Id. § 32(b).
101. Id. § 32(c). Interestingly, the code does not address claims such as child-
support or alimony, which, for example, under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code are non-
dischargeable claims. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 523 (1993 & Supp. 1998). One should remem-
ber, however, that the CRBA initially did not really focus on personal bankruptcies, a
term that was not within the Communism vocabulary at all.
102. See CRBA, supra note 69, § 33(l)(a), (d).
103. See discussion supra Parts I.A.1-2 (describing procedure in such a context).
104. Outcomes of disputed claims are given deference to the original classification
of a claim by either the statute or by the trustee and said discretion within the court is
not subject to appeal. Id.
105. Cf. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985) and Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985). In the United States, both those acts
protect creditors from fraudulent transfers of property. Moreover, the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code confers powers on the trustee to avoid specific pre-petition transfers. See 11
U.S.C.A. §§ 544, 547-548 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
106. See CRBA, supra note 69, § 14(l)(f).
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seeks a protective proceeding,' °7 any preferences granted to any creditor
during that time are subject to rescission.3 8 Both the CRBA as well as
the Criminal Code of the Czech Republic will void and punish collusive
actions between a debtor and the creditor as far back as three years
before the bankruptcy filing.109
Although this treatment of pre-bankruptcy conveyances appears to
be equitable in nature, no provision in the law deals with the situation
where several creditors have been paid shortly before bankruptcy and
other creditors have not been paid at all. This could give rise to a rebut-
table presumption that if the code applies to a single creditor it will also
apply to many creditors. One could speculate that payments made in the
ordinary course of business would not fall under the category of fraudu-
lent conveyances, however, there is no case law on this issue yet.
5. Discharge-Treatment of the Debtor's Pre-Bankruptcy Debts
The most important question for a debtor in any bankruptcy pro-
ceeding will be the status of the pre-bankruptcy debt. There are different
approaches throughout the world. Some, primarily, the United States,
Great Britain, France, and Germany, believe the main goal of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding is to reallocate resources in a way most beneficial to
the economy. By giving the debtor the opportunity for a new start, new
business opportunities are created."10 Unlike in the past, a debtor who de-
clares bankruptcy does not face imprisonment."' The next paragraph dis-
cusses how the CRBA provides for the discharge of pre-bankruptcy
debts.
The CRBA speaks only to discharge of debts under either the settle-
ment or compulsory settlement situation; under either, the debtor must
come up with a plan which provides for scheduled payments." 2 If the
debtor satisfies all the claims under the plan, he is discharged from all
107. See supra Part IL.A.2.
108. See CRBA, supra note 69, § 14. Under normal circumstances, such a protective
proceeding lasts from three to six months. See supra Part ml.A.2. However, in the case of
a farm, such a protective proceeding can last up to nine months. See CRBA, supra note
69, §§ 67(c), 5a, 5b, 5d.
109. See CRBA, supra note 69, § 15(2); see also Criminal Code of the Czech Re-
public, § 256.
110. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 522-524, 727, 1141, 1328 (1993 & Supp. 1998); see also Sak
& Schiffman, supra note 4, at 938.
111. For general discussion of the imprisonment of debtors, see Vern Countryman,
Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor and A Modest Proposal to Return to the Seven-
teenth Century, 32 CAmT. U. L. REv 809 (1983).
112. See supra Part.lI.A.2.
[Vol. 22
1998] BANKRUPTCY: CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY AND POLAND 97
claims that did not come under the plan." 3 The CRBA again is silent on
the treatment of discharge under a liquidation proceeding. However, one
could draw an analogy with the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which does not
discharge bankrupt enterprises that are continuing to do business from
their debt." 4 One can only guess why this is the case. Most likely, it will
be considered a disincentive for other corporations to buy such bankrupt
companies and use the operating losses of such companies to offset cor-
porate income tax liabilities. There remains one other question with the
liquidation of a business entity. Does a creditor have recourse against the
person who personally guaranteed the business entity's debt? The answer
is yes; a creditor can pursue an action against guarantors in state court."5
B. Hungary
1. Definition of Insolvency and Administration
of the Bankruptcy Proceeding
Hungary's insolvency law was passed in 1991 and amended in July
1993.116 Under pre-amendment Hungarian law, a business was required to
declare bankruptcy within eight days of realizing its impossibility to pay
a debt, and within ninety days of the debt becoming due."7 This provi-
sion was removed in 1993 because of the high number of 14,000 bank-
ruptcy petitions filed in 1992.118
Venue in Hungary lies with the county court where the debtor has a
registered office. The HLBA does not provide for a special bankruptcy
court." 9 Once the petition is filed, the law mandates the appointment of a
trustee, commonly referred to as a liquidator. 20 The court then adjudi-
cates the debtor to be insolvent under three scenarios: 1) the debtor fails
to settle the claim within sixty days of the filing of the petition; 2) the
debtor successfully defends his interests in an execution (collection) pro-
ceeding; or 3) the debtor defaults on a payment pursuant tb a reorganiza-
113. See CRBA, supra note 69, §§ 42, 63.
114. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1994).
115. Id. It is essential that the CRBA eventually address these claims in order to
give a fresh start to unsuccessful business ventures in the Czech Republic.
116. Hungarian Rules of Law in Force, Law IL of 1991 on Bankruptcy Procedures,
Liquidation Procedures and Final Settlement, Nr. 11123. [hereinafter HLBAI.
117. See id. § 9.
118. Cheryl W. Gray, Evolving Legal Frameworks for Private Sector Development
in Central and Eastern Europe, 10-11 (World Bank Discussion Papers No. 209, 1993)
[hereinafter Gray, Evolving Legal Frameworks].
119. See HLBA, supra note 116, § 6(1).
120. Id. § 14.
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tion plan. 121
2. The Rights and Obligations of Debtors and Creditors
A debtor may voluntarily file for either liquidation or reorganization,
whereas a creditor can only file a petition for liquidation.' 22 Generally, a
creditor has to assert a claim against the debtor by submitting his claim
to the liquidator, unless legal proceedings were commenced before the
liquidation proceeding occurred. 123
The law provides for an automatic stay of any claims as of the day
of the filing.' 24 Hungary's law, among the three under consideration, is
the most favorable toward reorganization as opposed to liquidation; in
fact, liquidation is to occur only when reorganization is not possible.1
25
A reorganization or compromise agreement works as follows: a
debtor, within fifteen days of filing for a reorganization, must meet with
the creditors who will vote on the moratorium.' 26 Under the amended in-
solvency law, only a certain percentage of the creditors must approve the
moratorium (which shall lead to a plan). 27 Should the court approve and
grant the stay, the debtor must produce a plan setting forth specific infor-
mation for restoring the insolvency.'12 Within three days before the expi-
ration of the moratorium, the debtor shall report the results of the negoti-
ations with the creditors. 129
Once the plan is approved, i.e., the creditors as a whole and the
121. Id. § 27(2).
122. Id. §§ 7, 22, 23(2).
123. Id. § 38(2).
124. Id. §§ 9, 12(2), 41-45 (exempting from the automatic stay claims for wages,
other benefits- presumably social security, health insurance, and unemployment benefits
and value-added taxes). Id. § 12(2).
125. Id., pmbl. The numbers, however, speak to the contrary. In 1992, more than
twice as many liquidation cases were filed in Hungary. See Gray, Evolving Legal
Frameworks, supra note 118, at 83; see also Prepared Statement of the Honorable Ralph
R. Johnson before the Subcommittee on Small Business, Federal News Service, May 12,
1994, at 92 (discussing how Hungary, by forcing larger enterprises into liquidation, cre-
ated smaller, more viable pieces available for purchase by private investors or funds).
126. Timothy John Smith, Hungary Irons out Insolvency Wrinkles, 28 INT'L CORP. L.
58 (September 1993). The moratorium is a time during which a creditor cannot enforce a
collection against the debtor. See HLBA, supra note 116, § 9.
127. Over fifty percent of the parties with claims that have matured by the day of
the petition as well as over twenty-five percent of the parties with unmatured claims as of
the day of the petition must approve of the plan. See HLBA, supra note 116, § 9. In ad-
dition, the above-required claims must count for at least two-thirds of the total creditors'
claims. Id.
128. See Sak & Schiffman, supra note 4, at 940.
129. See HLBA, supra note 116, § 21(1).
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court have approved the plan, all creditors are bound by it. 30 Given the
limited time available to a debtor corporation, many entities may refrain
from seeking reorganization. Fifteen days is an exceedingly short period
of time to produce an alternative plan. Therefore, many debtors initially
may file a liquidation proceeding to avail themselves of the automatic
stay.1
3 1
3. Distribution of Assets-Priorities and Post-Bankruptcy Creditors
Hungary is the only one of the three countries discussed that does
not give secured claims the highest priority, but subordinates them to ad-
ministrative costs. 32 Arguably, this regulation is contrary to the best in-
terest of the economy because creditors might be less willing to lend
money to customers. 33 On the other hand, an equally valid argument
could be made that if the trustee is not assured that all expenses associ-
ated with the bankruptcy estate are paid, the administration of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding will not be carried out in the most efficient manner.'3
Under the reorganization or compromise agreement, the creditors, by
approving the plan, agree on the order in which the debts will be satis-
fied. 135 In the context of a liquidation proceeding, the following hierarchy
has been established. Following administrative expenses, liquidation costs
such as employee severance pay must be paid. 36 If any money remains,
secured debts, followed by wages and employee benefits are accorded the
next highest priority. 37 Claims from private persons for non-economic
activities, such as a private loan extended to the debtor, is next in line.'3
Social security obligations and taxes, other claims, and interest and pen-
alties, in that order, close out the hierarchy.139
130. Id. §§ 19(4).
131. See Smith, supra note 126, at 58. In comparison, it is not unusual for many
Chapter 11 reorganizations in the United States to take years before a viable plan is
designed.
132. See Gray, Evolving Legal Frameworks, supra note 118, at 12.
133. See supra Part II.A.
134. See Sak & Schiffman, supra note 4, at 947-48. It is not unheard of for the liq-
uidation of an estate in a bankruptcy proceeding to barely cover the administrative
expenses.
135. See HLBA, supra note 116, § 43.
136. Id. § 57(2).
137. Id. § 57(1).
138. Id. Presumably, the reasoning for according a relatively high priority to claims
of this type is that many private lenders are more affected by a bankruptcy than commer-
cial lenders.
139. Id. The provision for "other claims" is presumably an allowance for post-
bankruptcy claims. However, the HLBA is silent on such matters.
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4. Fraudulent Conveyances and Avoidance Powers
Under the HLBA, both a creditor and a liquidator can challenge pre-
bankruptcy filing contracts and conveyances.140 Secured debts will not be
challenged, unless the security interest was created within six months of
the filing of the bankruptcy proceeding.'14 The code provides for such se-
curities to be converted into unsecured claims. 42
5. Discharge-Treatment of the Debtor's Pre-Bankruptcy Debt
Under a reorganization (settlement), all creditors are bound by the
plan as long as dissenting creditors receive equal or better treatment as
those creditors approving the plan as a whole. 43 Thus, dissenting credi-
tors in a reorganization procedure receive at least as much as they would
in a liquidation proceeding.' 44 The HLBA does not expressly state that all
claims against the debtor in a liquidation process are discharged upon the
completion of the bankruptcy proceeding. 45
C. Poland
1. Definition of Insolvency and Administration
of the Bankruptcy Proceeding
Poland has had a formalized bankruptcy code since 1934.' 46 While
originally a presidential order, it was amended into Poland's new bank-
ruptcy act in 1990.147 Under the Polish PLBA, an entity is bankrupt
under two situations. First, when the debtor has stopped paying debts.' 48
140. Id. § 40.
141. Id. § 57(1)(b). The code does not give any broad provision, other than voiding
security interests given within the six months or transfers which were made gratuitously
or to relatives within that time frame.
142. Id.
143. Id. Presumably the acceptance of the plan by a creditor as a whole is the
equivalent to a discharge for all claims not covered under the plan.
144. If one compares this notion with U.S. law, the Hungarian standard is less ob-
jective. Under U.S. law the standard is that of how much a creditor would have received
in a liquidation proceeding. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1993 & Supp. 1998). Of
course, many times in a Chapter 7 proceeding no money is accorded to a creditor. There-
fore, even if that is a more objective criteria, under Hungarian law, the dissenting creditor
receives at least as much money as the accepting creditor and it is rather unlikely that the
accepting creditors would accept a plan calling for no money.
145. See Sak & Schiffman, supra note 4, at 939.
146. Regulation by the President of Poland of October 1934.
147. Bankruptcy Act, DZ U. No. 14, item 87 (1990) [hereinafter PLBA].
148. Id. art. 1, § 1.
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Second, utilizing the balance sheet insolvency approach, a legal person
can be declared bankrupt where the assets are not sufficient in value to
satisfy liabilities. 49 The debtor has to file a bankruptcy petition within
fourteen days of either of the two scenarios described above. 15° Should
the debtor fail to file within the fourteen-day time limit, the judge-
commissioner has the discretion to refuse any future plan of reorganiza-
tion and to impose civil or criminal penalties. t"' The number of compa-
nies filing for liquidation proceedings in the first six months of 1993
numbered in the thousands. 5
2
Venue of the proceeding lies with the district court where the debtor
has her principal establishment. 53 The PLBA explains in detail what the
following must contain: the bankruptcy petition,154 the provisions for the
automatic stay, 55 dismissal if the costs of the proceeding exceed the
debtor's assets, 56 and the contents of the court's bankruptcy declara-
tion. 5 7 Once a petition for liquidation is filed, the court will appoint a
judge commissioner and a receiver (trustee). 58 The PLBA provides for
appellate review of the initial determination of bankruptcy and the final
approval of the plan under reorganization.1
59
2. The Rights and Obligations of Debtors and Creditors
A debtor can petition for the opening of a reorganization proceed-
ing.' 6° If a debtor so elects, he can be exempted from having to file
149. Id. art. 1, § 2.
150. Id. art. 5.
151. Id. art. 5, §§ 3, 177(4). This paper, however, is not concerned with any such
penalties.
152. Pawel Wrabec, Bankruptcy: The Fall Artists, POLISH NEWS BULL., Aug 13,
1993.
153. See PLBA supra note 147, art. 8, § 1. In the case where the debtor has several
places of principal establishments in districts of various courts, the petition has to be filed
within one of those district courts. Should the debtor have no principal place of business
in Poland, then residence of the debtor determines venue. Should the debtor satisfy none
of the foregoing criteria, then venue lies with the district court in whose district the estate
of the debtor is situated. Id.
154. Id. art. 9.
155. Id. art. 12.
156. Id. art. 13
157. Id. art. 14.
158. Id. art. 14, § 1(3); arts. 87-109. The judge-commissioner supervises the course
of the proceeding, inspects the acts of the trustee, and limits the discretionary power of
the trustee as regards acts performed by same. Id. art. 87. The receiver takes possession
of the estate and administers its liquidation. Id. art. 90.
159. Id. arts. 17, 192.
160. Id. arts. 171-201. Creditors' banks are accorded a special status whereby they
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within the fourteen-day time period. 16 1 A creditor may initiate a petition
at any time. 62
Once a reorganization petition is filed and the judge-commissioner is
appointed, it is the judge-commissioner who draws up the schedule of
payments (reorganization plan). 163 If the plan does not call for the 100%
satisfaction of unsecured debts, unsecured creditors who hold a total of
no less than two-thirds of the value of debts must approve the plan.164
Once the plan is approved by the creditors, both the judge-commissioner
and the court must also approve it; their approach is subject to different
criteria. The judge-commissioner can only reject the plan if 1) it is un-
realistic or 2) the debtor is barred from entering into such an arrange-
ment. 65 The judge-commissioner's determination of the appropriateness
of a plan is not subject to appeal. 66 The judge, in determining the ap-
proval of the plan, will look at criteria such as whether the plan is con-
trary to the bankruptcy law, the information provided to the creditors
prior to voting on the plan, conformity of the plan with public order, or
whether the dissenting creditors are put in too much of a disadvantage by
the plan. 67 The court's decision can be appealed.16' Once the plan has
been given final approval by all parties, the plan can be set aside for
only one of two reasons: 1) fraudulent conveyance of assets by the
debtor or 2) default on the plan.169
are allowed to implement restructuring arrangements, such as debt-for-equity swaps,
before full privatization of an enterprise. See Law on Mutual Agreement (1934) and Law
on Financial Restructuring of Enterprises and Banks, DZ.U. No. 18, item 82 (1993).
However, this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
161. See PLBA, supra note 147, art. 2.
162. Id. A creditor, who initiates the proceeding can be required by the court to ad-
vance the costs of the proceeding, otherwise, the court has the discretion to dismiss the
creditor's petition. Id. art. 11.
163. Id. art. 171.
164. Id. arts. 174, 185. Cf 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129 (1993 & Supp. 1998). One hundred
percent payment can still mean impairment and therefore, a class of creditors is not
deemed to automatically have approved of the reorganization plan.
165. See PLBA, supra note 147, arts. 176-177. Reasons for not allowing a debtor to
enter into such an agreement can include, for example, prior bankruptcy within the last
five years or not cooperating with the receiver in attempting to coordinate the estate.
166. Id. art. 178.
167. Id. arts. 189-192. Creditors objecting to a plan are allowed to present their is-
sues at a hearing. Id.
168. Id. art. 192.
169. Id. arts. 197-201.
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3. Distribution of Assets-Priorities and Post-Bankruptcy Creditors
The PLBA sets forth a list of priorities. Absolute priority is ac-
corded to debts secured by mortgages and liens. 70 Next in priority are
the costs of the proceeding, i.e., administrative expenses, followed by
claims for expenses incurred by the trustee.' 7' Thereafter, the priorities
are in order of declining importance: taxes for two years prior to the pe-
tition; social security payments for one year prior to the petition; other
claims plus interest; contractual damages and related costs; other inter-
ests; penalties and fines; and donations and bequests.
72
4. Fraudulent Conveyances and Avoidance Powers
If a debtor fraudulently conveys assets, a previously approved plan
may be set aside. 73 The PLBA has different time frames for different
types of conveyances. 7 4 The courts will void any gratuitous act that oc-
curred within one year prior to the filing. 75 Any security interests
granted within two months prior to the filing will be declared null and
void and have no effect on the estate. 76 Another act that constitutes a
fraudulent conveyance is when a debtor enters into a contract with cer-
tain extended family members within the six months prior to the peti-
tion.'n Moreover, the PLBA accords creditors the power to file an appeal
against any of the debtor's actions which place the creditor at a major
disadvantage. 78
5. Discharge-Treatment of the Debtor's Pre-Bankruptcy Debt
Under the reorganization plan (or the court-approved arrangement)
between the debtor and the creditors, the discharge of any claims not
provided for in the plan is binding and final on all of the parties in-
170. Id. art. 207. Strangely, the PLBA does not provide for those portions of the se-
cured debts that are unsatisfied by the creditor's mortgage and lien to go into the un-
secured claims, i.e., there appears to be no bifurcation. Id.
171. Id. art. 203. Strangely, administrative expenses seem to include wages and pen-
sion monies owed by the debtor.
172. Id. art. 203, § 2.
173. Id.
174. Id. arts. 53-58.
175. Id. art 53, § 1.
176. Id. art 53, § 2. However, a bona fide creditor can petition the court to declare
his security interest valid. Id.
177. Id. art. 54.
178. Id. art. 55. This is probably less a question of fraudulent conveyances and more
of general avoidance powers.
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volved.17 9 It can only be circumvented when there is a default on the
plan. 80 In the case of a liquidation proceeding, the PLBA does not dis-
charge the debtor from claims that were not recognized by the bank-
ruptcy proceeding, and therefore the creditor can still bring those claims
once the bankruptcy proceeding has terminated.' 8 The debtor, however,
has the right to have those claims quashed one year after the completion
or discontinuation of the bankruptcy proceeding.18 2 This last provision
presumably gives the debtor some leverage against creditors. Even so,
the PLBA does not afford a debtor protection after bankruptcy against
discrimination, which includes the termination or denial of employment,
a refusal to sell a new car on credit, or the refusal to rent an apartment
to the debtor. 3 Therefore, before having a claim quashed, debtors should
consider its effect on their future dealings with creditors and their reputa-
tion within the community.
IV. 11 U.S.C. § 304: ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS
With the collapse of Communism, a huge market opened up for in-
vestments and interconnected companies between the former East Bloc
and the West. Each year more international companies are chartered, cre-
ating a greater potential for transnational bankruptcies. Transnational
bankruptcies cause problems when the debtor owns assets in several
countries and becomes insolvent. 84 The International Bar Association's
Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act, the European Union's
Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, and the United Nations' Com-
mission on International Trade Law have all attempted to create an inter-
national code harmonizing cross-border bankruptcy proceedings. 85 The
United States however, is not a signatory or subscriber to any interna-
tional agreement on general insolvency matters.8 6 This section will
179. Id. art. 193.
180. Id. art. 197, §§ 1-2. See supra Part III.C.1.
181. Id. art. 169.
182. Id. art. 170, § 2. Unless the debtor has acknowledged the claim in bankruptcy
proceedings, a valid judgment over the claim has not been made. Id.
183. Cf. 11 U.S.C.A. § 525(a), (b) (1993 & Supp. 1998) (stating that governmental
units and private employers may not discriminate with respect to employment). A sales-
person, when deciding whether to extend credit to a potential customer, will presumably
be influenced by the fact that the customer has had a debt quashed in the past.
184. Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson, Transnational Bankruptcies: The Section 304
and Beyond, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 329, 331-32 (1993).
185. See generally Gerold Herrmann, International Cooperation on Cross-Border In-
solvency Issues, 24 INT'L Bus. LAW. 218 (1996).
186. Harold S. Burman, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law: A United
States Perspective, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2543, 2544 (1996).
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briefly look at the U.S. Bankruptcy Code's ("USBC") attempt at creating
a mechanism whereby the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts recognize foreign
bankruptcy proceedings. Once the criteria under which foreign proceed-
ings are recognized has been discussed, the last part of this section will
look at whether a bankruptcy proceeding, initiated in any of the three
countries discussed earlier, will meet the requirements of Section 304(c)
of the USBC provision.
A. Cases Ancillary to Foreign Proceedings
1. Development of USBC Section 304
Before the enactment of Section 304 in 1978, a foreign bankruptcy
trustee could only succeed in a cross-border insolvency proceeding when
there was compliance with the common law doctrine of comity.' 87 Com-
ity is generally granted only when the foreign law is similar to U.S.
law.188
The territoriality and the universality doctrines are two methods that
have emerged to determine whether a foreign bankruptcy proceeding
would be recognized. 8 9 Under the territoriality approach, only property
that is located within the country's jurisdiction is distributed to creditors
who appear before the court and assert a claim. 190 In contrast, under the
universality approach, one main proceeding is initiated, presumably in the
country where the debtor is domiciled or has its principal place of busi-
ness, and the debtor's property, regardless of location, is distributed uni-
formly to all creditors. 19' After Congress added Section 304 to the USBC
187. Eric W. Lam, Bankruptcy Code Section 304(b)(3): "Other Appropriate Relief'
for Multinational Bankruptcy, 16 BROOK J. INT'L L. 479, 482 (1990).
188. Can. S. Ry. Co. v. Gephard, 109 U.S. 527, 539 (1883) (granting comity to a
Canadian citizen because Canadian law is similar to United States law); Cunard S.S. Co.
v. Salen Reefer Servs., 773 F.2d 452, 459 (2d Cir. 1985) (granting comity to a Swedish
bankruptcy proceeding); In re Petition of Brierley, 145 B.R. 151, 165-66 (Bankr. S.D.
N.Y. 1992) (extending recognition to an English proceeding under Bankruptcy Code
§ 304(d), due in large part to comity).
189. Barbara K. Unger, United States Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies, 19 INT'L
LAW. 1153, 1154 (1985).
190. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies:
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. LJ. 457, 460 (1991).
191. See Kraft & Aranson, supra note 184, at 336; Donald T. Trautman, Foreign
Creditors in American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 29 HARv. INT'L L.J. 49, 56-57 (1988).
Prior to Congress adding § 304 to the USBC, courts tended to recognize foreign bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Stacy Allen Morales & Barbara Allen Deutsch, Bankruptcy Code
Section 304 and U.S. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: The Tyranny of Comity, 39
Bus. LAW. 1573, 1586-87 (1984); In re Petition of Brierley, 145 B.R. 151, 162 n.5
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1992); In re Enercons Virginia, Inc., 812 F.2d 1469, 1472 (4th Cir.
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in 1978, a foreign representative' 92 was able to file for protection of a
debtor's U.S. property in an ancillary proceeding. 93 It appears that Sec-
tion 304 serves more the universal approach than the territorial approach
by allowing U.S. courts to forego jurisdiction over U.S. property, thereby
permitting the distribution of that property in accordance with a foreign
bankruptcy court's plan. 94 The USBC does not, however, mandate the
universalist approach on the court, but leaves it to the discretion of the
individual bankruptcy judge. 95 Congress has set forth six guidelines for
judges to use when dealing with petitions from foreign bankruptcy trust-
ees.' 96 Once the court has considered those guidelines, it may grant the
relief requested by the foreign representative in the form of a turnover of
property, an injunction, or other relief.1'7
2. Proceedings Available to the Foreign Trustee
A foreign trustee could always commence an involuntary proceeding
under Chapter 7 or 11 against a foreign debtor as an ancillary case to a
foreign proceeding. 98 The foreign trustee could also file a petition under
Section 305 of the USBC asking the court to abstain from any adjudica-
1987); In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891, 896, 899 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1985); Daniels v. Powell, 604
F. Supp. 689, 693 (N.D. M. 1985); Kenner Products Co. v. Societe Fonciere et Financiere
Agache-Willot, 532 F. Supp. 478, 479 (S.D. N.Y. 1982).
192. A foreign representative is a trustee or similar official of an estate in a foreign
insolvency proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (1994). It is not required that the foreign
trustee be an entity of the type that would be required under Section 109. In re Goerg,
844 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1988).
193. 11 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1994). Property located in the United States is now seen as
part of a larger estate of the debtor that should be turned over to a foreign representative.
Even so, a foreign representative can still file a full bankruptcy proceeding under Section
303(b)(4) of the USBC. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(4) (1994).
194. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(2) (1994). There are, however, proponents of the theory
that the United States has adopted neither the universalist nor the territorial approach, but
rather accepts pieces of both. See Unger, supra note 189, at 1155-56. But even these pro-
ponents recognize that the trend clearly goes towards the universalist approach. Id.
195. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1994). There are no sections of the USBC that require a
bankruptcy judge to apply a universal distribution approach to U.S. property. One might
argue that this notion would be contrary to public policy and therefore, even forbearing
jurisdiction over any U.S. property, would be unconstitutional.
196. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1994). See infra Part V.A.3.
197. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1994) (describing the relief available).
198. 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(b)(4), 304(a) (1994). Prior to the amended USBC of 1978,
foreign representatives could not commence proceedings in the United States courts un-
less they convinced local creditors to file on their behalf. John D. Honsberger, Conflict of
Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 631, 639-40
(1980). Nevertheless, relief was often available to foreign representatives under the doc-
trine of comity. See supra Part V.A.1.
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tion of issues relating to a debtor or its property. 1' Lastly, a foreign trus-
tee may file a petition under Section 304 of the USBC asking the court
to: 1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of any actions against
the debtor or its property; 2) enjoin the enforcement of a judgment or
lien against such property; 3) turn over the property to the foreign repre-
sentative as part of the foreign proceeding; or 4) ask for other appropri-
ate relief." The factors that a court must consider when determining the
type of petitions available to the foreign trustee will be discussed in the
next section.
3. Section 304(c) Guidelines for Granting the Appropriate Relief
Section 304(c) directs bankruptcy courts to:
be guided by what will best assure an economical and expedi-
tious administration of such estate, consistent with:
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims or interest in such
estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against
prejudice
and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such for-
eign proceedings;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of
property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in
accordance with the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a
fresh start for the individual that such foreign proceeding
concerns.201
One needs to look at each of the six criteria individually before ar-
riving at an overall picture. The first two criteria appear to contradict
each other. The court is to consider the just treatment of all claims or in-
terest in such an estate, including those arising outside of the United
199. 11 U.S.C. § 305(b) (1994). The court might grant such relief if, for example,
an out-of-court workout arrangement is in the making; no prejudice arises to any creditor,
and any involuntary proceeding is recalcitrant. 11 U.S.C. § 305 (1994) (Historical and
Revision Notes, Senate Rep. No. 95-989). A decision by the court to dismiss under Sec-
tion 305 is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise. 11 U.S.C. § 305(c) (1994).
200. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(1)-(3) (1994).
201. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1994). Section 304(c) specifically directs the court to look
at these factors.
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States, while simultaneously protecting the interests of United States
claim holders. Can the two be reconciled? Congress must not have in-
tended for the second guideline to be interpreted too strictly; otherwise,
any Section 304 proceeding would be without merit from the outset.
What are the criteria in determining whether something is too prejudicial
or inconvenient to a United States creditor in the foreign bankruptcy pro-
ceeding? Case law generally holds a foreign proceeding to be too incon-
venient or prejudicial if, for example, a foreign law does not provide
American creditors with similar procedural and substantive protections as
would the American law;202 or forces them to travel to the foreign fo-
rum.20 3 The inconvenience of travel, however, is far from being a conclu-
sive factor. Courts often allow foreign forums despite the inconvenience
to the U.S. creditor as long as the claims processing procedure is funda-
mentally fair.204 Where the laws of the foreign forum are in harmony
with those of the United States and where they are are not repugnant to
American laws, courts will usually find no inconvenience or prejudice." 5
The next guideline for courts to consider, is how the foreign pro-
ceeding handles the prevention of fraudulent conveyances and transac-
tions.2°6 The prevention of fraudulent transactions is a major policy un-
derlying U.S. bankruptcy law.Y As with the first two guidelines, if one
were to apply this guideline strictly, there would be no need for Section
304.m Therefore, the courts should not compare whether the foreign pro-
ceeding has the exact same type of protection to prevent fraudulent con-
veyances, but rather whether the foreign law would protect the U.S. cred-
itor substantially the same way as they would be protected in a U.S.
bankruptcy proceeding. Case law seems to support the substantially simi-
lar approach.209
202. Interpol, Ltd. v. Certain Freights of M/V Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373, 377
(Bankr. D. N.J. 1988), appeal dismissed, 878 F.2d 111 (3rd Cir. 1989); In re Papeleras
Reunidas, S.A., 92 B.R. 584, 591 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
203. In re Lineas Areas de Nicaragua, 13 B.R. 779, 780 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981)
(stating that having U.S. creditors seek payment in Nicaragua is an alternative that should
be avoided if possible).
204. In re Brierley, 145 B.R. 151, 162-63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
205. In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629-30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). See In re Banco de
Descuento, 78 B.R. 337, 339 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987).
206. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3) (1994).
207. Ulrich Huber, Creditor Equality in Transnational Bankruptcies: The United
States Position, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 741, 752 (1986).
208. Given the very strict view of prevention of fraud and preference in the U.S.
courts, there is a risk that courts applying the foreign law may find that the same protec-
tion is not granted to U.S. creditors as would be the case if the creditor were to submit
himself to the foreign proceeding. Id.
209. See In re Metzler, 78 B.R. 674 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that foreign
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The fourth guideline requires the courts to look at the distribution of
proceeds according to a Title 11 order. The question again is how closely
must the distribution scheme in the foreign proceeding match the scheme
under the USBC. 210 If the match required is too close, the court will dis-
allow the foreign petition. 21' One case seems to suggest that the foreign
countries' laws must be an exact match or otherwise, the Section 304
proceeding is doomed to fail.212
The strongest case in support of turning over U.S. property for dis-
tribution in the foreign proceeding is In re Culmer,213 in which the court
held that where the foreign law is not "inherently vicious, wicked, im-
moral or shocking to the prevailing American sense," there is no reason
not to recognize the foreign proceeding and grant relief according to Sec-
tion 304.214 If one were to adopt this standard, the United States would
be a big step closer to a truly universal approach, thus opening the way
for becoming a signatory to international insolvency treatises.
The fifth guideline, comity, has been discussed in Part V.A.1. The
last guideline directs the court to look at whether the debtor is afforded a
fresh start. Because the fresh start provision can only apply to a natural
person,215 the likelihood of the court facing a transnational bankruptcy in-
preference and fraudulent transfer actions seeking to recover property located in the
United States provided sufficient basis on which to allow a case ancillary to foreign pro-
ceeding); In re Egeria Societa Per Azioni di Navigazione, 26 B.R. 494 (Bankr. E.D.Va.
1983) (holding that preference action can be brought in foreign ancillary bankruptcy pro-
ceeding); In re Gercke, 122 B.R. 621 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1991) (holding that in determining
whether to grant relief in case ancillary to foreign bankruptcy proceeding, the court has to
be concerned with whether the foreign law provides for the prevention of preferential dis-
position of estate property and not with just treatment of holders of claims in the resolu-
tion of the claims).
210. Given the fact that foreign laws are almost always different from U.S. laws,
this guideline potentially can eliminate any request for relief.
211. See Interpool Ltd. v. Certain Freights of M/V Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373
(Bankr. D.NJ. 1988) (holding that the absence of an equitable subordination doctrine in
Australian law is dispositive in granting a § 304 relief), appeal dismissed, 878 F.2d Ill
(3d Cir. 1989). The court ignored that there are differences between the United States and
the Australian bankruptcy systems of which the creditor was aware before entering into
business in Australia. Gene Cheever, Australian International Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 153, 155 (1991).
212. In re Toga Manufacturing Ltd., 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D.Mich. 1983) (holding
that although the creditor would not be inconvenienced by litigating his claim in Canada
and furthermore would receive just treatment in the Canadian courts, nevertheless, the
property could not be turned over because of the difference in classification in the Cana-
dian as opposed to the U.S. proceeding).
213. 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
214. Id. at 629-31.
215. If a natural person files for a liquidation proceeding, a new start is the next
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volving a natural person is marginal at best.
Courts take different approaches with regard to the six criteria in
Section 304(c) of the USBC. Some courts require that all six elements
are satisfied before awarding relief, thus changing the guidelines into pre-
requisites.216 Other courts have found the element of comity to be the
dominant element when it comes to awarding relief under Section 304.17
B. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland's Insolvency
Proceedings and the Six Criteria of Section 304(c) of the USBC
There is no case law that deals with a foreign bankruptcy trustee
from any of the three countries filing a petition for relief under Section
304.218 In determining whether a petition by a foreign bankruptcy trustee
from any of the three countries would succeed, one necessarily will have
to look to the specific regulations of an individual country's bankruptcy
proceeding. Case law takes three approaches to a Section 304 proceed-
ing: 1) the strict comity approach, that is, the foreign law must be the
same in all respects; 2) the prerequisite approach, that is, all six guide-
lines of Section 304(c) must be complied with; and 3) the substantially
similar approach. It is apparent that neither of the three nations' laws
would satisfy the first two approaches; therefore, this Article will analyze
only the situations where the courts apply the substantially similar ap-
proach or the "not inherently vicious, wicked, immoral or shocking to
the prevailing American sense" approach.2 9 The analysis will only touch
briefly on the guideline of comity because there is not enough case law
as to whether comity exists in the Czech Republic, Poland or Hungary to
make an informed decision.220 The next three subsections will address
step. If a non-natural legal entity files for liquidation, the owners of the bankrupt com-
pany can start under a new name. Should a company file for reorganization, there is no
need for a fresh start.
216. See In re Toga Manufacturing Ltd., 28 B.R. at 165; In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891,
900 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
217. See In re Brierley, 145 B.R. 151, 163 (Bankr. S.D.Fla. 1987).
218. This should not come as a surprise given the fact that the three countries are
still in the infancy stage as regards privatization and insolvency law matters.
219. See supra Part V.A.3.
220. This does not mean, however, that one should not engage in speculation. Pre-
sumably, all three nations will become members of the European Union. See Six Coun-
tries to Begin EU Membership Talks Next Year, AGRA Euii., July 18, 1997, at E3. Further-
more, the United States, after Germany, is the country with the highest amount of
investment in either country. Eventually, this process will allow for Czech, Hungarian,
and Polish companies to invest in the United States and before long, one is facing the
problem of transnational insolvencies. Facing reality, the legislatures of those three na-
tions will have to enact provisions in their respective bankruptcy laws that allow for ex-
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problems each country's bankruptcy trustee will be confronted with in a
Section 304 proceeding before a U.S. bankruptcy judge.
1. The Czech Republic
Looking at reasons why a Section 304 proceeding initiated by a for-
eign trustee from the Czech Republic might fail, one criteria comes to
mind: fraudulent Conveyances. The policy of voiding unfair preferences
is not unknown under the CRBA, but the Act does not provide guide-
lines as detailed as the USBC accords to a creditor.22' However, looking
at the fact that voidance provisions exist in the CRBA, one might argue
that the Czech Republic's law is not repugnant to American law. Case
law seems to support the rationale of not requiring an exact match of the
foreign law, but only a substantially similar protection afforded to Ameri-
can creditors under the foreign proceeding. 222
Presumably, one could find difficulties with some of the criteria. For
example, the CRBA does not specifically provide for a fresh start, i.e.,
the total discharge of all pre-bankruptcy debts in a liquidation proceed-
ing.23 However, it does provide for the discharge of all claims that were
not payable under a reorganization plan. 224 Given the novelty of bank-
ruptcies to CEE countries, initially many bankruptcies involved govern-
ment entities and not natural persons. Therefore, law makers might not
have seen a need to provide for a fresh start of an individual in a per-
sonal liquidation proceeding, something which was even more remote
than a state enterprise failure under the old Communist system.
Another potential problem is the non-appealability of bankruptcy de-
cisions. 225 One should, however, look beyond a strict analysis of this is-
sue. Two reasons exist why not to hold this idea against the foreign peti-
tioner: the fast track approach of privatization, and the novelty of the
topic itself. Under the fast track approach, the Czech Republic was at-
tempting to facilitate foreign investment, thus boosting the economy and
counteracting the side effects of liquidating enterprises. 226 Once reality
catches up, amendments to the CRBA presumably will remedy this defi-
ciency and the CRBA will provide for the appealability and disposition
of a bankruptcy proceeding.
actly such situations and therefore, out of necessity, the doctrine of comity will guide the
three nations' legislatures with respect to Bankruptcy law.
221. See supra Part IV.A.3. Cf. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 546-551 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
222. Id.
223. See supra Part I.A.5.
224. Id.
225. See CRBA, supra note 69 and accompanying text.
226. See supra Part II.A.
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Yet another problem is the way the CRBA classifies claims and thus
affects priorities and distribution. However, one should not interpret the
meaning of Section 304(c)(4) of the USBC to require that a foreign pro-
ceeding exactly classify and distribute the assets in the exact same man-
ner as under Title 11. If this were the situation, no relief in an ancillary
case could be granted. Regarding the treatment of claims, the CRBA pro-
vides for a hierarchy of claims, which is somewhat dissimilar 7 from the
priorities afforded a U.S. creditor. Nevertheless, the CRBA provides for a
classification of claims into priorities, something which is also done in
the USBC.2n
U.S. case law purports to emphasize the voidability of prefer-
ences.229 The mere existence of some differences in treating preferential
transfers should not constitute a problem for the courts in recognizing a
Czech bankruptcy proceeding. As discussed above, the CRBA provides
for equitable treatment of similarly situated creditors, meaning that a U.S.
creditor, if he were forced to litigate a claim under a Czech bankruptcy
proceeding, would be given the same rights as similarly situated credi-
tors. In addition, the CRBA provides for time limitations as to how long
before the petition for bankruptcy any conveyances made will be de-
clared null and void. The time limit and provisions are not exactly the
same as in the USBC; however, they afford protection to a creditor
which are similar to the protection afforded a creditor in a U.S. bank-
ruptcy proceeding.
2. Hungary
A Hungarian trustee presumably will face difficulties satisfying the
requirement of just treatment and distribution under Section 304(c) of the
USBC. To revisit briefly the Hungarian classification of priorities, the
biggest discrepancy between the HLBA and the USBC is that under
Hungarian law a secured creditor is not given the highest preferential sta-
tus, but rather finds his claims subordinated to administrative costs.2 ° If
one recalls In re Toga Manufacturing,231 the court dismissed the applica-
227. This is especially so for claims pertaining to wages and social security and
pension benefits. But under the Communist system, there was no unemployment and eve-
rybody was entitled to a pension. Therefore, to soften the initial shock wave created by
the onset of capitalism, the legislature made mass unemployment a high priority. In so
doing, a burden was lifted from the government's shoulders.
228. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
229. See Huber, supra note 210, at 752.
230. See supra Part IH.B.3. See also Gray, Evolving Legal Frameworks, supra note
118, at 12.
231. In re Toga Manufacturing Ltd. 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D.Mich. 1983).
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tion of the Canadian trustee for a turnover of property located in the
United States on the grounds that, although the creditor would receive
just treatment in Canadian courts, a difference in classification in the Ca-
nadian as opposed to the U.S. proceeding would impair the American
creditor's claim.232 Even if the court were to find that a U.S. creditor
would receive just treatment in the Hungarian Courts, undoubtedly, a
U.S. bankruptcy judge must deny a Section 304 proceeding because the
classification discrepancy is too big, thus impairing the U.S. creditor
enormously. Leaving the above aside, the Hungarian proceeding classifies
claims and prioritizes these claims in a similar fashion to the USBC.
233
With regard to the treatment or prevention of fraudulent convey-
ances, the HLBA will declare null and void any conveyance within a six
month period prior to the bankruptcy filing. Moreover, it converts any
secured claim derived at in said fashion into an unsecured claim.234 The
USBC treats conveyances similarly. However, the USBC calls for a one-
year voidance time frame. 235 Conceivably, the additional six months pro-
vided for under the USBC affords a U.S. creditor better protection in a
U.S. proceeding. Nevertheless, the concept is the same, i.e., fraudulent
conveyances are not tolerated by the law.
With respect to other guidelines, both systems reflect similar ap-
proaches to a liquidation or reorganization, albeit somewhat differently. 236
The Hungarian system of affording dissenting creditors in a reorganiza-
tion at least equal or better treatment than what an approving creditor re-
ceives is not as objective of a standard as the U.S. system, where dis-
senting creditors must receive at least as much as under a liquidation. 237
The counterargument would be that the provision is useless when a credi-
tor is not entitled to receive anything under the liquidation procedure.
There is another potential problem which a Hungarian trustee in a
liquidation proceeding might face under Section 304(c) analysis, i.e., the
HLBA does not expressly state that upon conclusion of the liquidation
proceeding all claims against the debtors will be discharged. The ratio-
nale behind this is similar to the one explained under the Czech Repub-
lic's analysis discussed supra. That is, the concept is too new and
amendments need to be made accordingly.
232. Id.
233. See supra Part III.B.3. Cf. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
234. See supra Part M.B.4.
235. 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
236. See supra Part I.B. Cf. 11 U.S.C. chs. 7, 11, 13 (1994).
237. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
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3. Poland
The PLBA appears to be very similar to the USBC. If one applies
the six guidelines set forth in Section 304(c) of the USBC to the Polish
proceeding, there are no major apparent flaws. The Polish bankruptcy
code accords just treatment to all claims by allowing creditors to vote on
the plan or to challenge bankruptcy decisions by the judge.238 Presuma-
bly, a U.S. creditor will not be prejudiced and inconvenienced by having
to litigate a claim in Poland.239 The PLBA has three time limitations with
regard to the prevention of fraudulent conveyances, thus voiding such
preferential transfers if they fall within the time frame.240 With regard to
the fourth guideline, the distribution or proceeds from the estate of the
debtor, the PLBA accords absolute priority to secured claims followed by
a well-developed hierarchy of priorities.24' Comity as of this moment is
non-existent. Nevertheless, as explained supra in Part V.A.1, discussing
the Czech Republic, it will be just a matter of time until comity is em-
bedded in the relation between the United States and Poland, whether
through statutory law or case law. Finally, a new start will be no problem
for a debtor under a reorganization. With regard to a fresh start after a
liquidation, currently, the PLBA does not discharge a debtor from all his
debts after the proceeding is completed. Nevertheless, the PLBA affords
the debtor to file a petition with the court to have its debts quashed one
year after the disposition of the bankruptcy proceeding and therefore, the
PLBA indirectly provides for a new start.242
V. CONCLUSION
This article has shown that the three former Communist countries
have come a long way from a centrally-planned economy to a free mar-
ket economy. Each of the three nations approached the economic transi-
tion in a somewhat different way and pace. Each nation completed an ec-
onomic transition but, equally important, achieved a legal transition as
well.
Bankruptcy is an important element in a free market society. The
three CEE countries have either reinvented, or newly created, their bank-
ruptcy laws. There can be no doubt that the legislators had the socio-
economic and cultural identities of their people in mind when they wrote
the insolvency laws. Unemployment was a major concern, yet at the
238. See PLBA, supra note 147, arts. 17, 192.
239. See supra Part IV.A.3.
240. See supra Part m].C.4.
241. See supra Part I.C.3.
242. See supra Part Il.C.5.
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same time, the desire to close the gap between their countries and the
West was a pushing factor. All three nations are on their way to becom-
ing members of the European Union.
This Article attempted to show whether a foreign bankruptcy trustee
from each of the CEE nations would be able to satisfy the guidelines of
Section 304 of the USBC. To date no such situation has occurred, but
with U.S. companies increasingly investing in the three nations, eventu-
ally, a U.S. bankruptcy judge will be faced with that exact situation. If
one were to apply the guidelines verbatim and in a matter of strict inter-
pretation, presumably no Section 304 proceeding applied for by a trustee
from any of the three nations would be successful. The global commu-
nity, however, is growing closer together and, in the spirit of future inter-
action between the United States and the Czech Republic, Hungary, or
Poland, each nation's bankruptcy proceedings are capable of meeting the
guidelines of Section 304(c) of the USBC. Admittedly, in subordinating
secured claims, which are generally recognized by modem bankruptcy
laws as the foremost claims in an insolvency proceeding, to administra-
tive expenses, Hungary has to overcome the biggest obstacle. Leaving
this aside, there is no apparent reason why a foreign trustee from any of
the nations should fail to complete successfully a Section 304(c)
proceeding.
Finally, one should look to three more reasons for recognizing the
three CEE nation's bankruptcy proceedings under Section 304 of the
USBC. First, the three countries modeled their insolvency laws after the
German insolvency code, which is given full recognition under Section
304 of the USBC. Second, all three nations eventually will become mem-
bers of the European Union and thus will utilize the European Union
Convention on International Insolvencies-an international treatise the
United States cannot afford to ignore. Lastly, the three countries are still
experiencing a learning curve, and being imperfect should not be held
against them. It appears that the so-called "Tunnel at the End of the
Light" 243 has become a light at the end of the tunnel.
243. See Cohen & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 7.

